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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PROVO CITY, a municipal cor-
poration, and TIMPANOGOS 
CANAL COMPANY, a Utah cor-
poration, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
DEE c. HANSEN, as State Engi-
neer of the State of Utah1 
'and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Bureau of Reclamation, 
Department of the Interior, 
Defendants-Respondents, 
; 
PROVO RIVER WATER USERS ASSO-
CIATION, a corporation, MBT-
ROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH LAKE 
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~oration, KElfllf!COTT COPPBB 
CORPOBATION, a,corpor•Fion, 
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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action both for declaratory judgment and to 
review the decision of the State Engineer, Dee C. Hansen, 
dated August 9, 1974, relative to Change Application No. a-5433, 
filed by Timpanogas Canal Company. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This action was initially filed by plaintiffs-appellants 
on October 4, 1974. (R. 231-248). The matter was thereafter 
submitted to the trial court on December 28, 1977, by Intervenors' 
motion to dismiss. (R. 39-43). 
Judge George E. Ballif, after hearing oral arguments granted 
defendant-respondents' motion to dismiss with prejudice on 
March 27, 1978. (R. 15-19). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek to have the District Court's decision 
reversed and the case remanded for a determination on the 
merits or in the alternative a dismissal without prejudice. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Change Application No. a-5433 was filed with the State 
Engineer by the appellant, Timpanogas Canal Company, on 
February 14, 1968. (R. 237-246). The application was filed 
to change the point of diversion and nature of the use of 4.0 
second feet of water out of a total of 11.29 second feet of 
water during the nonirrigation season which had been con-
tracted to Provo City by Timpanogas Canal Company. (R. 237). 
The Change Application was advertised and protests were 
lodged by Utah Power and Light Company, Kennecott Copper 
-2-
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Corporation, the Central Utah Water Conservancy District, E.E. and 
Alice P. Conrad, Mrs. Warren A. and Darel A. Conrad, Provo River 
Water User's Association, Metropolitan Water District of Salt 
Lake City, Utah Lake Distributing Company, and United States of 
America, Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation. 
(R. 237). 
Hearings were conducted by the State Engineer at Provo, 
Utah on September 24, 1968 and February 10 and 11, 1969 and the 
defendant, Dee C. Hansen, rendered his Memorandum Decision on 
August 9, 1974. (R. 237-239). 
The State Engineer, in his memorandum decision, concluded 
that the described Change Application should be approved'but 
assigned limitations and express conditions to the time, amount, 
and use of the water. ( R. 239). 
The appellants then filed suit challenging the State Engi-
neer's decision on October 4, 1974. (R. 231). The appellants 
alleged four separate causes of action. The first was brought 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 73-3-14 (1953), as a trial de 
novo in accordance with the provisions of U.C.A. 73-3-15 (1953). 
(R. 231-33). 
The Second Cause of Action was brought pursuant to u.c.A. 
78-33-1 (1953) seeking a declaratory judgment that the improvement 
of appellants' water system would not adversely affect the rights 
of others in the drainage basin, that appellants are the owners 
of the waters which they would conserve by changing the distri-
bution system from an earthen canal to a pipeline, and that con-
ditions 1 and 3 of the Memorandum Decision of the State Engineer 
-3-
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dated August 9, 1974 were beyond the authority of the State 
Engineer to impose. (R. 232-33). 
The Third Cause of Action was likewise brought pursuant 
to U.C.A. 78-33-1 (1953) and sought a declaratory judgment that 
Utah Power & Light Company would suffer no loss of power revenues 
due to granting the Change Application, and that condition 4 
of the Memorandum Decision of the State Engineer dated August 
9, 1974, was beyond the authority of the State Engineer to impose. 
(R. 234-235). 
The Fourth Cause of Action sought a Declaratory Judgment 
that there were no prior rights that needed satisfaction prior 
to the appellants' diversion into the proposed system, and that 
the State Engineer had no power or authority to impose Condition 
5 of the Memorandum Decision of the State Engineer dated 
August 9, 1974. 
The respondent, Dee C. Hansen answered the complaint on 
October 24, 1974. (R. 222-228). A motion to intervene was 
made by Provo River Water Users Association, Metropolitan Water 
District of Salt Lake City, Utah Lake Distributing Company, 
Kennecott Copper Corporation, Salt Lake City, and Central Utah 
Conservancy on December 30, 1974. (R. 209-212). The pre-trial, 
held on January 3, 1975, was therefore occupied primarily with 
consideration of the motions to intervene and the appellants' 
objections thereto. (R. 182). The Court after hearing argument 
allowed the parties additional time to file memoranda and affi-
davits supporting their respective positions on the intervention 
issue. (R. 182). 
-4-
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On January 10, 1975, the Court granted the motions of the 
applicants for intervention as defendants but reserved its 
ruling on the Motion to Intervene made by Central Utah Water 
Conservancy District pending the submission of additional memo-
randa. (R. 153-154). 
Subsequently, additional parties applied for intervention 
on January 23, 1975 (R. 147-148). These parties, Scott P. 
Wallace, Ruth Wallace, Darel A. Conrad, Vilate P. Conrad, Charles 
E. Conrad and Alice P. Conrad, had made no previous protest before 
the State Engineer contesting the proposed Change Application. 
(R. 147, 237). 
Intervenors then filed a motion to dismiss and. objection 
to the appellants' pre-trial order on January 24, 1975. The 
Intervenors among other things, contended that the order was 
premature. (R. 134-135). 
The Court ruled on February 27, 1975, that Central Utah 
Conservancy District and the other applicants for intervention 
could intervene and file their answers. (R. 127). The Court 
further held that Utah Power and Light Company and the United 
States of America were indispensible parties and ordered the 
appellants to join them. (R. 102, 128). 
Appellants filed an Amended Complaint on March 19, 1975. 
(R. 103-108). Answers to the Amended Complaint were filed by 
April 15, 1975. (R. 77). 
Intervenors filed a Motion to Dismiss on December 29, 1977, 
which was granted on March 24, 1978. (R. 15). 
-5-
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POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY APPLIED UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
73-3-15 TO DISMISS THE ACTION OF PROVO CITY AND TIMPANOGOS 
CANAL COMPANY. 
The respondents based their Motion to Dismiss on U.C.A. 
73-3-15 (1955) which provides that "an action to review a 
decision of the State Engineer may be dismissed upon the 
application of any of the parties upon the grounds provided 
in Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the 
dismissal of actions generally and for failure to prosecute 
such action with diligence." The statute then states that 
"for the purpose of this section failure to prosec~te a suit 
to final judgment within two years after it is filed, or, if 
an appeal is taken to the Supreme Court within three years 
after the filing of the suit, shall constitute lack of 
diligence." 
It is the appellants' contention that the trial court 
misinterpreted this statute and improperly applied it. 
A. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing the Action With 
Prejudice. 
It is important to note initially that there is no 
language in U.C.A. 73-3-15 (1955) that would lend credence 
to the supposition that the failure to prosecute an action 
to final judgment within the delineated time period warrants, 
of necessity, a dismissal of the action with prejudice. The 
statute only establishes the time period which is to be 
deemed by the Court to constitute "lack of diligence" under 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. There is no 
indication in the statute of any legislative intent to 
modify the established rules for determining whether an 
action should be dismissed with or without prejudice. It would 
seem that once the court has ferreted out, by use of the two 
and three year limitation outlined in the statute, a "lack 
of diligence" on the part of one of the parties, the Court 
then must determine whether the action should be dismissed 
with or without prejudice by using established guidelines 
which stand unmodified by U.C.A. 73-3-15 (1955). 
Justice Crockett in Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. 
Paul W. Larsen Construction, Inc., 544 P.2d 876 (Utah, 1975) 
stated the guidelines to be employed by the courts in deter-
mining whether a cause should be dismissed with or without 
prejudice as follows: 
. • • It is not to be doubted that in order 
to handle the business of the court with effi-
ciency and expedition the trial court should 
have a reasonable latitude of discretion in 
dismissing for failure to prosecute [citing 
cases] if a party fails to move forward 
according to the rules and the directions of 
the court, without justifiable excuse [citing 
cases] . But that prerogative falls short of 
unreasonable and arbitrary action which will 
result in injustice. Whether there is such 
justifiable excuse is to be determined by 
considering more factors than merely the 
length of time since the suit was filed. 
Some consideration should be given to the 
conduct of both parties, and to the oppor-
tunity each has had to move the case forward 
and what they have done about it [citing 
cases]; and also what difficulty or prejudice 
may have been caused to the other side; and 
most important, whether injustice may result 
from the dismissal. 
-7-
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It is indeed commendable to handle cases with 
dispatch and to move calendars with expedition 
in order to keep them up to date. But it is 
even more important to keep in mind that the very 
reason for the existence of courts is to afford 
disputants an opportunity to be heard and to do 
justice between them (Emphasis added) 
Westinghouse, supra at 878-9. 
Justice Wilkins applied the same guidelines in Polk v. 
Ivers, 561 P.2d 1075 (Utah, 1977) and reversed the decision 
of the district court dismissing the plaintiffs' action with 
prejudice. 
Finally, the Court in Utah Oil Company v. Harris, 565 
P.2d 1135 (Utah, 1977) listed numerically the guidelines 
previously advanced by the Court as: 
1. The conduct of both parties. 
2. The opportunity each has had to move the case 
forward. 
3. What each of the parties has done to move the 
case forward. 
4. What difficulty or prejudice may have been 
caused to the other side. 
5. And, most important, whether injustice may 
result from the dismissal. 
Utah Oil Company v. Davis, supra, at 1137. The court in 
Utah Oil Company, Supra, stated explicitly that "where all 
of the litigants had power to obtain relief and failed to do 
so, it is error to dismiss with prejudice." Utah Oil Co. 
v. Harris, supra at 1137. 
Although it could conceivably be argued that a trial 
court, because of statutory usurpation, does not retain any 
discretion to modify the two or three year limitation period 
which is outlined in U.C.A 73-3-15 (1955), the trial court 
-8-
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has never been stripped of its power to dismiss an action 
without prejudice by either the legislature or the court. 
The only case discussing the statute was Dansie v. Lambert, 
542 P.2d 742 (Utah 1975), the issue was not raised by the 
parties nor discussed by the majority opinion. The only 
mention was by Justice Ellett in a concurring opinion in 
which he stated that he would "concur but would add that in 
his opinion the Court could have dismissed without prejudice." 
Dansie, supra at 744. There can be no inference from that 
statement by Justice Ellett that the majority held that all 
cases dismissed under U.C.A. 73-3-15 (1955) must be d~smissed 
with prejudice. The logical inference from that statement, 
since that issue was not before the Court, is simply that 
Justice Ellett added that statement as dictum to serve as a 
guide for future determinations. 
Certainly, in the absence of clear legislative intent, 
the Court should not require a manditory dismissal with 
prejudice in situations which would not require a dismissal 
under Rule 41 U.R.C.P. A simple illustration might be 
helpful. Under Rule 4l(b) U.R.C.P., a party moving for 
dismissal must show both inordinate delay and the other 
factors outlined in the Westinghouse, supra, before the 
action would be dismissed, and even then, the determination 
of whether it is to be with or without prejudice is discre-
tionary with the judge. Under U.C.A 73-3-15, a party moving 
for dismissal need only show a failure to bring the action 
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to final judgment in two years and is not required to show 
any of the factors outlined in Westinghouse, supra. To hold 
that the cases falling into the latter group must, as a 
matter of course, be dismissed with prejudice without 
giving the trial court the opportunity to examine the cause 
of the delay, the complexity of the case, the amount of harm 
caused by the delay and the opportunity of both parties to 
advance the case, would be the height of injustice, 
especially when a statutory mandate to that effect is 
totally lacking. A fortori, in matters of this type, 
involving public rights, where both sides have equal ability 
to advance the case, it is totally unfair to punish one side. 
The facts of this case show that the state engineer 
took in excess of five years, from February 14, 1968, (the 
date Change Application No. a-5433 was filed), until September 
9, 1974, to notice the application, hold the appropriate 
hearings and then issue a Memorandum Decision. (R. 237-246). 
The extended amount of time taken by the state engineer 
certainly authenticates the plaintiffs' claim relating to 
the complexity of the case as it existed before the state 
engineer. 
The evidential intricacy inherent in the issues of the 
case was compounded further by the events occurring after 
the filing of the complaint on October 4, 1974. Despite the 
fact that the state engineer promptly answered the complaint 
on October 24, 1974 (R. 222-228), and despite the fact that 
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the case had been set for a pre-trial conference to be held 
on January 3, 1975 (R. 207), the Motions to Intervene made 
by twelve new parties (R. 147-149, 209-212), seriously 
impeded the tempo of the entire proceeding and complicated 
the burden the plaintiff had to bear. 
The appellants' contention in this regard is simply 
that the trial court erroneously interpreted the statute 
(U.C.A. 73-3-15) as mandating a dismissal with prejudice, 
and therefore, did not consider or evaluate any of the 
factors outlined in Westinghouse, supra. Although the 
appellants concede that the reversal of a dismissal with 
prejudice normally requires the court to find an abuse of 
discretion by the lower court, the appellants contend that 
when the district court has refused to use its discretion, 
the court need only find that the district court erroneously 
failed to employ its discretion in the matter. 
Finally, Utah Code Annotated 73-3-3 (1959) states in 
part that: 
Any person entitled to the use of water may change 
the place of diversion or use and may use the 
water for other purposes than those for which it 
was originally appropriated, but no such change 
shall be made if it impairs any vested right 
without just compensation. 
If the Court finds that this case should be dismissed 
with prejudice, the problem then becomes one of deciding 
what issues can be raised in the form of res judicata in a 
subsequent case. 
Would a dismissal with prejudice operate as an adjudication 
-11-
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of the issue that the proposed change application interefered 
with vested rights when the state engineer, in his determination, 
found to the contrary? If another application was submitted 
by the appellants changing the point of diversion to an area 
six inches down the river from the point designated in the 
application involved in this case, would the present case 
preclude the approval of such an application? The questions 
are endless. The fact of the matter is, that this applica-
tion and the issues involved in the case have not been 
determined on the merits. In fact, the dismissal of this 
case with prejudice would contradict most of the findings of 
the state engineer if it acted as an adjudication of the 
validity of the change application. The facts are that the 
state engineer approved the change application and then 
assigned certain conditions to his approval. The engineer, 
in effect, found no vested rights that would be damaged 
under the terms of his approval. Under such circumstances 
the meaning and effect of a dismissal with prejudice are, to 
say the least, tenuous. 
It would seem that a better interpretation of the 
statute under such facts would be for a dismissal without 
prejudice recognizing the problems involved in any other 
determination. After all, the dismissal with its accompanying 
loss of time and money is sufficient punishment for a party 
not complying with the statute. 
-12-
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B. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing the Plaintiffs' 
Complaint in its Entirety. 
The amended complaint filed by the appellants in this 
case recited four causes of action. Only the first cause of 
action was brought pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated 73-3-14 (1953). The other three causes of action 
were brought pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-33-1 (1953) 
for declaratory judgment. (R.103-118). 
The statute forming the basis of the respondent's 
motion to dismiss only encompasses those actions brought 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 73-3-14 (1943) to review, by 
means of a trial de novo, the decision of the state engineer. 
There is no basis in the statute to justify the imposition 
of the two and three year limitation on causes of action 
that are brought pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act. 
The court therefore erred is dismissing the complaint 
in its entirety without making a determination on the factors 
outlined in Westinghouse, supra. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 
U.C.A. 73-3-15. 
The appellants are aware of Dansie v. Lambert, supra, 
which characterizes the statute's requirement that any 
action brought pursuant to U.C.A. 73-3-14 which is not 
brought to final judgment in two years be dismissed as a 
manditory requirement. It is the appellants' contention 
-13-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that a statute delineating a time period in which a party 
must prosecute a case is very different from a typical 
statute of limitations. Under the latter, a plaintiff can 
commence his action without being hindered by any adversary 
party and therefore most statutes of limitations have been 
interpreted as being reasonable. But under the former type 
of statute the adversary parties are totally free to prolong 
the litigation, in effect, depriving the plaintiffs of their 
cause of action. 
It is only logical that the complexity of a case 
coupled with the actions of the adverse parties could easily 
carry a case over the two year limitation. To hold that an 
equity court has no ability to modify the limitations period 
under those circumstances would impose an unreasonable 
restraint on a plaintiff who attempts to pursue his equitable 
remedy. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants' contention is based on the assumption that 
the court misinterpreted the statute (U.C.A. 73-3-15) and 
then erroneously dismissed the appelants case without con-
sidering and evaluating the guidelines previously announced 
by the Court. The court also erroneously dismissed all of 
the appellants' complaint which is tantamount to an 
enlargement of the scope of u.c.A. 73-3-15. Finally, this 
case presents the question of whether a court retains the 
equitable power to modify the limitations statute when the 
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facts so warrant. It is the appellants position that justice 
and equity require the retention of such a power by the court. 
Respectfully submitted this Z<fiAday of August, 1978. 
OWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
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